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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JOSE CRISTOBAL CARDONA, 




BRYAN A. BLEDSOE, Warden; A.W. HUDSON, Assistant Warden; B TRATE, 
Captain; C/O ANDERSON; LT. FLEMING; HARREL WATTS; REGIONAL 
DIRECTOR J.L. NORWOOD; HARLEY LAPPIN, Director BOP; MS. HAMILTON; 
JOE KEFFER; DR. LIZARDI; MR. TOWNSEND; DARREN BRACY; GERARDO 
MALDONADO; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; SCOTT 
DODRILL; MS. BIRDSALL; BOP; DR. KARPAE; DR. MINK; JOHN DOE, SIS LT. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-00054) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 






                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Jose Cristobal Cardona, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from orders of the 
District Court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, and 
denying his own motions, in this action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm. 
 In 2011, Cardona filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, raising claims related to his confinement in the Special 
Management Unit (SMU) at USP Lewisburg.  He named as defendants numerous Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP) employees, including several out-of-state BOP officials.  The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the District 
Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state BOP officials, that Cardona  
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to several of his claims, and that the 
undisputed facts established their right to judgment as a matter of law on the remaining 
exhausted claims.  The District Court agreed, and entered judgment in favor of the 
defendants.1  Thereafter, Cardona filed motions seeking reconsideration, the return of 
legal documents, and an evidentiary hearing regarding exhaustion of administrative 
                                              
1 The District Court also denied Cardona’s motions for appointment of counsel, for class 
certification, to compel discovery, to permit him to prepare documents electronically, for 
partial summary judgment, and for an evidentiary hearing.   
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remedies.  The District Court denied those requests, and Cardona filed a timely notice of 
appeal.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review district court decisions 
regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the 
same de novo standard of review.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 
(3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  Summary 
judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 
773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).  
 The District Court correctly determined that Cardona did not assert any 
jurisdictional facts that would support personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state BOP 
officials.  See Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., 983 F.2d 551, 554 
(3d Cir. 1993) (stating that, where the defendant has raised a jurisdictional defense, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction can be exercised).  
Cardona claimed that the out-of-state BOP officials conspired to create an “experimental 
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program” to transfer “unwanted inmates” to the SMU.  This vague allegation of a 
conspiracy is insufficient to demonstrate that the nonresident defendants “maintained 
systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state,” Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 
537 F.3d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing general personal jurisdiction), or that they 
“purposefully directed [their] activities at a resident of the forum . . . .”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(describing requirements for establishing specific personal jurisdiction).  Accordingly, 
the District Court properly dismissed the out-of-state BOP officials for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.2  Cf. First Chicago Int’l. v. United Exchange Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378-
79 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that “the ‘bare allegation’ of conspiracy or agency is 
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction”).   
 Several of Cardona’s remaining claims were not exhausted.  The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging 
specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials until he has exhausted 
available administrative remedies.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 
F.3d 65, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to 
                                              
2 Cardona has not explained how he could have amended the complaint to satisfy the 
personal jurisdiction requirements, nor has he demonstrated that the District Court abused 
its discretion in not sua sponte transferring the matter to a court that could exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state BOP officials.  Even if jurisdiction existed, 
Cardona’s conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not satisfy the plausibility standard of 




Bivens claims).  “Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary” to satisfy 
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.3  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).  An 
untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal does not 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement, thereby precluding an action in federal court.  See id. 
at 84, 90-91; Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement contains a procedural default component).  If prison officials 
thwart a prisoner’s ability to exhaust his administrative remedies, however, those 
remedies are not considered “available” within the meaning of § 1997e.  See Brown v. 
Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Cardona conceded that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with 
respect to all of his claims, but asserted that he was unable to do so because prison staff 
did not provide him with the necessary forms and failed to process his grievances.  We 
agree with the District Court, however, that the documents Cardona submitted in support 
of his allegation do not raise genuine issues of material fact.  Three of the documents are 
letters from Cardona to the warden, dated December 27, 2010, January 19, 2011, and 
                                              
3 In determining whether a prisoner has met the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, we 
look to the prison’s procedural rules.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).  The BOP 
has established an administrative remedy procedure, pursuant to which an inmate must 
first present his complaints to prison staff informally.   See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13.  If 
unsuccessful, the inmate may file a formal administrative remedy request.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 542.14.  If the inmate is unsatisfied with the response he receives from within the 
institution, he may file an appeal with the appropriate regional director.   See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 542.15(a).  Finally, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the response of the regional 
director, he may file an appeal with Central Office’s general counsel.  See id.  
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May 18, 2011, complaining about the inadequacy of the administrative remedy process.  
In particular, Cardona alleged that his prison counselor had not “filed or processed” 
several informal resolution forms.4  In response, the warden explained that the documents 
that Cardona “gave to [his] unit team were not completed on the correct form [and] . . . 
[t]herefore . . . were not treated as Informal Resolution [Attempts].”  Cardona does not 
dispute that the unprocessed grievances were submitted on incorrect forms.  Prison 
officials did not interfere with the grievance process so as to make administrative 
remedies unavailable to Cardona.  Rather, Cardona failed to follow proper grievance 
procedures.  Therefore, the District Court properly held that Cardona failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with respect to several claims.  
                                                                                                                                                  
   
4 In the letter dated May 18, 2011, Cardona claimed that his prison counselor refused to 
provide two informal resolution forms.  Cardona supported this allegation with an 
affidavit from another inmate who stated that he witnessed the prison counselor deny 
Cardona’s request for the forms.  The warden’s response to Cardona’s letter noted that 
“the administrative remedy log for your unit reveals that you have received two [informal 
resolution forms] since arriving in J-unit on May 6, 2011.  It does not appear that you are 
being denied access to the administrative remedy process.”  The District Court resolved 
this factual issue in the defendants’ favor, noting that “the record shows that Cardona 
successfully utilized the administrative remedy procedure to fully exhaust some claims 
during the same time period that he claims USP Lewisburg staff were thwarting his 
efforts to follow that procedure to exhaust other claims . . . .”  See Small v. Camden 
Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013) (“hold[ing] that judges may resolve factual 
disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without the participation of a jury.”). We 
conclude that this was not clear error.  Id. at 271 (stating that District Court findings of 




 As to those claims which Cardona did exhaust, we conclude, for substantially the 
reasons provided by the District Court, that they lack merit.  Cardona argued that his 
constitutional rights had been violated in connection with his placement in the SMU.5  
Administrative segregation implicates a protectable liberty interest only if it dramatically 
departs from basic prison conditions.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Cardona’s placement in the SMU was within “the ordinary incidents of prison 
life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  Indeed, transfers from lesser to more 
restrictive units in a prison generally do not implicate a protected liberty interest because 
some incursions on liberty are to be expected within a prison.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 
U.S. 472, 484 (1995).   
 In addition, the conditions of confinement in the SMU did not impose “atypical 
and significant hardship[s] on [Cardona] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 
life.”  Id.  For instance, Cardona asserted that double-celling in the SMU violated the 
American Correctional Association’s (ACA) standards on adequate living space.  But 
noncompliance with national standards concerning minimum space requirements does 
not establish a constitutional violation, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979) 
(stating that “while the recommendations of these various groups [such as the ACA] may 
be instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional minima; 
                                              
5 We have held that Cardona’s prior challenges to his placement in the SMU, via petitions 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, were properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  See 
Cardona v. Thompson, 551 F. App’x 630, 631 (3d Cir. 2013); Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 
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rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in question.”), and Cardona 
presented no evidence that double celling resulted in Eighth Amendment violations.  See 
Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “double celling can 
amount to an Eight Amendment violation if combined with other adverse conditions.”).  
Cardona’s claim regarding an allegedly unconstitutional visual search by Captain Trate 
fails because he did not refute Captain Trate’s affidavit indicating that he had no personal 
involvement in the alleged search.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-77 (holding that respondeat 
superior is not a viable theory of liability in a Bivens action).  Cardona further 
complained about limited access to the law library, but he did not allege he suffered an 
“actual injury” (i.e., that he lost an opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous claim).  See 
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).  Finally, the principles announced in 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 
646-48 (1997), bar Cardona’s claim that on March 15, 2010, prison employees sought to 
“stage [a] fight” by forcing him to occupy a cell with a rival gang member.  After the 
fight, a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) concluded that Cardona had committed the 
prohibited act of fighting, and sanctioned him to, inter alia, the loss of 27 days of good 
conduct time.  The DHO’s report, which has not been overturned, see Cardona v. 
Bledsoe, 2011 WL 2670002, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 2011), rejected Cardona’s defense that he 
was forced into the cell.  Therefore, if his arguments here were accepted, the result would 
                                                                                                                                                  
F.3d 533, 534 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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“imply the invalidity” of the disciplinary conviction and resulting loss of good conduct 
time.  Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.6     
                                              
6 We reject Cardona’s challenges to the District Court denial of his motion for 
appointment of counsel, Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993), his motion 
for class certification, In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litig., 148 
F.3d 283, 308-09 (3d Cir. 1998), his motion to supplement the amended complaint, Estate 
of Oliva v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of State Police, 604 F.3d 788, 803 (3d 
Cir. 2010), his motion to prepare documents electronically, M.D. Pa. Local Civil Rule 
5.1(i) (providing that exception to typewritten filing requirement may be made “in the 
case of papers filed by a pro se litigant”), his motion for the return of legal documents, 
Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997), and his motion for reconsideration, 
Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
